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The papers published in this special issue of Marine Resource Economics were ini-
tially presented at the Workshop on Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries
Management held in Reykjavik, Iceland, August 27-29, 2006. This workshop was
organized by RSE, an Icelandic think tank, with financial support from the Ministry
of Fisheries in Iceland, the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners, and
Iceland’s commercial banks Glitnir and Landsbanki Islands. On behalf of the RSE, I
use this opportunity to thank these sponsors for their generous support. I also thank
my co-editor, Professor Rognvaldur Hannesson, for his help with the peer review
process. Finally, thanks are due to The MRE Foundation, as represented by the edi-
tor, Professor James Anderson, and the technical editor, Barbara Harrison, for its
support of this project.
Hopefully, it will not be seen as too much of a simplification to claim that eco-
nomic science has generated three fundamental perspectives on the fisheries
problem. One is the externality perspective. Another is the fisheries game perspec-
tive, and the third is the property rights perspective. These perspectives are by no
means mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they complement each other. This does
not mean that they are equivalent, however. One of them may be more illuminating
or, more importantly, of greater help in improving fisheries than the others. The fun-
damental motivation for the workshop that generated the papers in this issue was
that, at least when it comes to the practice of fisheries management, the property
rights perspective is the most useful.
It is widely agreed that the modern theory of fisheries economics was launched
by Scott Gordon’s 1954 article in the Journal of Political Economy (Gordon 1954).
Of course, this wasn’t the first analysis of the problem—scientific progress rarely
evolves in that way. In the years preceding Gordon’s paper, an informal group of
economists including A.D. Scott, J. Crutchfield, R. Turvey, and Gordon himself had
been discussing the problems of fisheries along lines similar to the ones that Gordon
made famous (Scott 1989, 1996, 2007). Besides, the Danish economist, Jens Warm-
ing, in a couple of articles in 1911 and 1931, forwarded essentially the same
analysis (Warming 1911, 1931; Andersen 1983). There is little doubt that other pre-
cursors can be found by historians of economic thought.
In his seminal contribution to the topic, Anthony Scott attempted to bring the
role of property rights to the forefront (Scott 1955a). Unfortunately, Scott’s analysis
was restricted to the case of a sole-owner fishery. While, on this basis, he essentially
proved that property rights were central to the fisheries problem, this crucial point
seems to have escaped most other researchers. Thus, my initial reading of Scott’s ar-
ticle, under expert guidance some 20 years later, indicated that the number of
participating fishers was crucial for the fisheries problem, not property rights as
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such. A reason for this obtuseness may have been that Scott, in his early contribu-
tions, did not proceed to the next stage of the analysis, namely fisheries property
rights held by a number of individuals. The same limitation applied to the “Swiss
Corporation” idea, which the UBC School of Fisheries Economics led by Scott pro-
moted. The idea was first proposed and developed in Scott’s book in 1955 (Scott
1955b) and subsequently taken up by Munro (1979) and Jones, Pearse, and Scott
(1980). The “Swiss Corporation” is simply a sole-owner fisheries company whose
equity is owned by fishermen or other stakeholders. Clearly, this sole-owner corpo-
ration idea remains a viable solution to the fisheries problem.
Scott’s initial emphasis on property rights as the key to the fisheries problem
was quickly overshadowed by the more traditional economic perspective in terms of
externalities. An early promoter of this approach was Ralph Turvey (1964—see also
Turvey and Wiseman 1957), and his lead was followed by most other researchers in
the field, including Smith (1969), Plourde (1970), Bell (1972), Hannesson (1974),
and Dasgupta and Heal (1979). One important consequence of the focus on exter-
nalities was that when it came to the practical issue of fisheries management, most
researchers in the field almost instinctively reached for Pigovian corrective taxation
(Crutchfield and Zellner 1962, Smith 1969, Brown 1974, Hannesson 1974, Dasgupta
and Heal 1979, Dasgupta 1982).
The suggestion to solve the fisheries problem by taxing already quite poor fish-
ermen was not exactly received with enthusiasm by fisheries managers. No matter
how insistent fisheries economists were on that particular solution, the socio-politi-
cal response remained a blank stare. As a result, the field of fisheries management
was de facto abandoned to what I like to refer to as the engineering or operations
research approach to the problem. This is an approach which sees the fisheries prob-
lem as essentially the technical task of adjusting fisheries inputs to biological and
economic possibilities. It ignores most of the relevant human behaviour and incen-
tives and has, consequently, proven singularly inept in suggesting effective solutions
to the fisheries problem.
So, for the first few decades following the inception of modern fisheries eco-
nomics, actual fisheries management, while not unaffected by economic analysis,
was primarily conducted by direct restrictions on the fishing activity, which hardly
any economist recommended. To protect and restore fish stocks, measures were
taken to enhance the productivity of the stocks and reduce harvests. These included
time and area closures to facilitate the spawning process and protect juvenile fish,
limitations on fishing time and restrictions on fishing gear and engine power to re-
duce the capacity of the fleet, and, sometimes, the imposition of total allowable
catches (TACs). To reduce aggregate fishing effort, investment restrictions, vessel
buyback schemes, and limitations on the number of fishing licences were intro-
duced. These and similar measures dominated ocean fisheries management from the
1950s until the 1980s and continue to constitute the backbone of the management of
the majority of fisheries today.
Needless to say, these direct restrictions proved of little use in halting the de-
cline of fish stocks and utterly ineffective in what really counted, restoring
profitability. Thus, it gradually began to dawn upon fisheries economists that their
focus on externalities as the culprit of the fisheries problem and taxation as the solu-
tion might not be the best product their science had to offer. In both academic and
practical circles, ideas that individual fishing rights might at least alleviate the fish-
eries problem were discussed. Papers expressing these ideas started to emerge. At
the same time, some fishing nations, including Holland and Iceland, began to ex-
periment with rights-based fisheries management methods. Thus, in 1976, Holland
introduced individual quotas (IQs) in her important North Sea flatfish fishery and
Iceland in her domestic herring fishery (Arnason 2002).Property Rights Based Fisheries Management 337
The earliest papers explicitly suggesting IQs to solve the fisheries problem that
I have been able to find is a limited circulation discussion paper by Christy in 1973.
Similar thoughts seem to have been on the minds of Quirk and Smith in their paper
in 1970, but not finding clear expression. My own paper in 1977, unfortunately only
published in Icelandic, explicitly discusses tradable IQs and proposes them as supe-
rior to taxation for generating efficiency in fisheries. Finally, a clear, fairly
systematic statement of the use of IQs to solve the fisheries problem was presented
in English in a paper by Moloney and Pearse (1979).
Nevertheless, during the 1970s and the early 1980s, it is fair to say that devel-
opments in property rights based fisheries management were led more by events in
the field than theoretical analysis. In addition to small-scale territorial use rights in
fisheries (TURFs), which were popping up in various sedentary mollusc fisheries, a
few important fishing nations designed and introduced IQs and individual transfer-
able quotas (ITQs) in their fisheries, not minding much that the theoretical basis was
largely non-existent. Thus, as already mentioned, Holland and Iceland introduced
IQs in some of their important fisheries as early as 1976. Iceland instituted a fully
fledged ITQ system in her herring fisheries in 1979. New Zealand introduced ITQs
in her deep-sea fisheries in 1983, as did Iceland in 1984 in her all-important demer-
sal fisheries. In 1986, New Zealand adopted a uniform ITQ system in all her
fisheries—the first such comprehensive ITQ system in the world. In stark contrast to
these real-life developments, it wasn’t until the late 1980s that the theory of prop-
erty rights based fisheries management caught up. An important landmark in this
respect was the conference on rights based fishing held in Reykjavik in 1988
(Neher, Arnason, and Mollett 1989). At that conference, the theory and practical as-
pects of the ITQ fisheries management, as well as that of other property rights
arrangements, such as TURFs and community fishing rights, were first systemati-
cally and clearly expounded.
Since the initial steps toward individual property rights in fisheries in the 1970s,
the use of property rights based instruments in the world’s fisheries has expanded
greatly. The most important property rights based systems are TURFs, ITQs, and
community fishing rights. TURFS have been found to be very effective, but they can
only be applied to species that are relatively sedentary, such as certain types of
shellfish. ITQs have broad applicability and are generally very effective in generat-
ing economic efficiency in fisheries. As a result, they have been widely applied over
the world. Over 10 major fishing nations have already adopted ITQs as a key com-
ponent of their fisheries management system. About 15% (some 12 million metric
tonnes) of the global marine fish catch is currently taken under ITQs. Various forms
of community fishing rights and co-management schemes exist around the world.
They are particularly suitable where it is difficult to introduce individual fishing
rights because of enforcement problems or for socio-political reasons. The economic
efficiency generated by community fishing rights appears to depend on two main
factors; the quality of the community fishing rights and how the community decision
process is set up. If community fishing rights are high quality, the potential for effi-
ciency is believed to exist. Unfortunately, there is not much hard evidence on the
actual efficiency of community-managed fisheries. What there is, however, suggests
that their efficiency varies a great deal from community to community.
Property rights in fisheries, like property rights in general, have proven to be
extremely effective, flexible tools for generating economic efficiency, provided they
are of sufficient quality. The world’s fishing nations are still in the initial stages of
adapting this tool and honing it for the needs of the various fisheries. There is no
doubt that there is still a long way to go before the full potential of property rights
in fisheries is realized. The papers published in this issue constitute attempts to
identify ways to enhance their contribution to socially beneficial fisheries.Arnason 338
Limitations of ITQs
Two papers deal with the limitations of ITQs, as they are normally applied, for solv-
ing the fisheries problem. The paper by Christopher Costello and Robert Deacon
entitled “The Efficiency Gains from Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ Fishery”
makes the fundamental point that the aggregative, discrete ITQ system—the kind of
ITQ system whish is almost exclusively employed in the world’s fisheries—will, in
general, not be fully efficient. An aggregative ITQ system issues one TAC for the
aggregate stock and, thus, does not distinguish between substocks by genetic make-
up, growth potential, year class, location, catchability, market value, and so on.
Obviously, to the extent that this heterogeneity applies, which would be the rule
rather than the exception, the shadow value of the respective substocks will be dif-
ferent. Consequently, an aggregative ITQ system cannot be efficient.
A similar, but not quite identical, problem arises with discrete ITQ-systems. A
discrete ITQ system is one which issues a TAC over a finite length of time. All of
the world’s ITQ fisheries do this, most commonly for a year at a time. If fishing
conditions vary over the period, for instance because of developments in the stock
size, seasonal catchability, and so on, the shadow value of the biomass will fluctuate
accordingly. Thus, the optimal TAC should also do so. It follows that an ITQ system
based on this kind of discrete TAC issue cannot be fully efficient. In addition, vari-
ability in individual profit functions over time, combined with discrete TACs, may
give rise to new external effects, such as crowding when profitability is high or an
inefficient harvesting profile over time.
Costello and Deacon explore these issues and how they relate to the limited
property rights contained in ITQs. Their fundamental conclusion is that disaggre-
gated ITQs; i.e., ITQs by each economically distinct substock, would solve the
problem stemming from aggregative ITQs and generate efficient utilization at each
point of time. This, of course, is not surprising. A fundamental result in market eco-
nomics is that heterogeneous goods should have different prices. Otherwise the
problem of missing markets arises. The same applies to ITQ systems. ITQs based on
undifferentiated TACs with respect to substocks only confer property rights in the
aggregate stock. Hence, there cannot be separate ITQ prices for substocks. This re-
sults in missing markets and economic inefficiency. Basically the same thing applies
to the time dimension. Shorter-period ITQ systems would reduce the inefficiency of
ITQ use over time. Continuous-time ITQ systems would, of course, eliminate it alto-
gether. Costello and Deacon refer to adequately diasaggregated and continuous-time
ITQ systems as fully delineated rights.
Thus, Costello and Deacon do not only identify some important limitations in
the property rights quality of most existing ITQ systems, they also point to the way
of improving these property rights and, thus, make them more capable of generating
economic efficiency.
The paper by Rognvaldur Hannesson entitled “Taxes, ITQs, Investments, and
Revenue Sharing,” considers another kind of limitation on the efficiency of ITQ sys-
tems. Hannesson points out that the common presumption that ITQs lead to optimal
investment in fishing capital will be unwarranted if there are other sources of distor-
tion in the system. The specific situation explored by Hannesson, the almost
universal one in fisheries, is where fisheries labour is remunerated on the basis of a
share in the gross output. This situation, of course, is essentially the familiar case of
sharecropping, which is known to be economically inefficient (Marshall 1920), un-
less compensated by actual labour exertions. In his paper, Hannesson ignores this
possibility and shows that that when labour remuneration in an ITQ fishery consists
of a share in the gross output, investment decisions will not be socially optimal. In
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fishery. The source of the problem, however, is not the ITQ system as such, but the
distortion created by the share remuneration system. Indeed, a corresponding distor-
tion would also apply in a sole-owner fishery, which was otherwise optimal, if it
were working under the same regime of labour remuneration. So, Hannesson’s basic
point is that the ITQ-system will not correct for distortions which have nothing to
do with property rights in the extraction process.
Having established this fundamental result, Hannesson goes on to explore ways
to correct for this particular distortion. He shows that the correct tax on the value of
fish landings will do the trick. On the other hand, according to Hannesson, no tax on
quota holding can do so. It seems likely, although Hannesson does not explore this,
that if sharecropping in an ITQ-managed fishery is truly inefficient, there will be a
tendency to adopt a more efficient labour contract in the long run. Another interest-
ing issue, not explored by Hannesson, is whether there are more incentives to adopt
sharecropping labour contracts in common pool fisheries than there would be in an
ITQ-based fishery in the long run.
Fisheries Management by ITQ Holders
My own paper entitled “Fisheries Self-management under ITQs,” considers the eco-
nomic aspects of having ITQ holders take care of the management of their fishery.
Fisheries management comprises: (i) the selection and modification of fisheries
management rules, (ii) the setting of specific fisheries management measures includ-
ing the TAC, (iii) the enforcement of the fisheries management system, and (iv) the
biological and economic research necessary for adequately discharging these func-
tions.
The analysis is motivated by a number of empirical observations. First, fisheries
management is generally a costly activity, representing, in most cases, a substantial
fraction of the gross landed value of the fishery. Second, due to problems of inad-
equate information, inappropriate incentives, and misalignment of costs and
benefits, the government is generally an inefficient provider of fisheries manage-
ment services. Third, under a properly designed ITQ system, the need for
government management is greatly reduced compared to what it would be under tra-
ditional fisheries management. This is because such an ITQ system defines
reasonably high-quality property rights in harvest volume and, thus, eliminates
many of the most detrimental externalities associated with common property re-
sources.
Under ITQs, the interests of the various ITQ holders regarding the underlying
marine resources tend to be aligned. Essentially, all of them want to maximize the
value of their ITQs. Thus, they will find it in their individual interest to promote,
participate in, and undertake collective measures to protect and enhance all the ma-
rine resources on which the fishery depends. Moreover, as a collective, the ITQ
holders are in a position to negotiate the withdrawal of ITQs or reduction of the
TAC with other users of ocean resources, such as the tourist industry and conserva-
tionists. Given well-defined property rights, this kind of negotiation may well lead
to an efficient overall resource use according to principles first explained by Ronald
Coase (1960). Thus, on a priori grounds, there appears to be strong reasons to ex-
pect that fisheries self-management by ITQ holders would be: (i) reasonably
economically efficient and (ii) much superior to centralized management by the gov-
ernment.
I go on to make these arguments more rigorous, recognizing that collective deci-
sion-making within the group of ITQ holders is basically the outcome of a
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(a condition not far from the reality in most fisheries), this game basically collapses
to the efficient solution—the only moves that make sense to individual ITQ holders
are those that maximize the overall value of the fishery. Moreover, even when fish-
ers are heterogeneous with respect to their technology, they would, under quite
plausible conditions, still agree on the value maximizing policy. Finally, irrespective
of any diversity of ITQ holders, if the group as a management unit is coherent
enough (or transaction costs are low enough) to make side payments possible, the
overall benefit maximizing solution is almost bound to occur.
On this basis, I conclude that entrusting the management of an ITQ fishery to
the ITQ holders may very well be the socially optimal way to proceed.
Community Management as an Alternative to ITQs
In a paper entitled “Turfs and ITQs: Collective vs. Individual Decision Making,”
José Cancino, Hirotsugu Uchida, and James Wilen consider space-based collective
management alternatives to decentralized species-specific ITQs. They point out that
while most of the fisheries management literature has been devoted to ITQs, other
rights-based fisheries management alternatives exist. More importantly, these alter-
natives may be more appropriate than ITQs to certain fisheries and social situations.
One obvious, and probably empirically highly relevant, case is where the enforce-
ment of ITQs is prohibitively costly. This would, for instance, often be the case in
small-scale, low-technology fisheries with a large numbers of fishermen, many land-
ing places, and short post-harvest processing and distribution lines.
Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen specifically study two prominent cases of commu-
nity-based management, the ones in the inshore fisheries of Chile and Japan. Their
approach is primarily descriptive. However, by reviewing the experience, they man-
age to detect certain patterns of possible general validity.
In spite of a great geographical and social distance between the two fisheries
and entirely different histories, there are many similarities between the community-
based arrangements. In both situations, the community rights are based on collective
TURFs. In the Chilean case, the TURFs are supplemented with collective harvesting
quotas. In both cases, there is a hierarchy of management from the basic units—
Fishery Management Organizations (FMOs) in the case of Japan and Management
Exploitation Areas (MEAs) in the case of Chile—to regional and national organiza-
tions. This hierarchy is more developed in the case of Japan than Chile. In both
systems, the fishermen belonging to the basic units have a high degree of collective
autonomy over how to manage their biologically determined allocations. Consider-
able collective effort is devoted to the management of fishing effort over space and
time in order to reduce spatial overharvesting and maximize revenues, often with
revenue pooling. But in both cases the actual determination of TURF-level alloca-
tions is guided and ultimately restricted by the government fisheries authorities at
high levels. Thus, in both cases, the system is properly described as one of co-man-
agement with higher authorities.
The history and state of evolution of the two systems are very different. The
Japanese TURF-based community management system originated in the feudal sys-
tem centuries ago. Since then, the system has evolved and taken forms according to
the wishes of its members. Thus, the Japanese system is quite mature and settled
with deep social and historical roots. Most of the rent generation appears to have
been driven by devolution of community-level TURF management into multiple,
smaller, species-specific FMOs that intensively manage their own fisheries. By con-
trast, the Chilean community management system was formally instituted by the
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at managing shellfish fisheries. Being recent, the system is still subject to quite
rapid evolution and change. At present, Chilean TURFs retain control and manage at
the local ecosystem level, including spatial and temporal management of individual
species, but also attempt to manage intra-species interactions. There are also differ-
ences in the species coverage of the two systems. The Japanese system comprises
basically all inshore fisheries. The Chilean system has devoted most management
effort to relatively sedentary benthic species, especially molluscs and seaweed.
One of the frequently mentioned conditions for a successful community man-
agement is a relatively small membership. It is interesting to note that this condition
seems to be met in both systems. In Japan, the average FMO membership is reported
to be 53, while in Chile the average MEA membership is 62. Another condition for
successful community management is restriction of entry. Formally, in both systems,
entry is open to new members who satisfy certain fairly unrestrictive conditions. In
practice, however, both systems have set up informal barriers to entry that seem to
be sufficient to keep new membership at bay. It is not clear, however, to what extent
these barriers would hold, if the benefits of entry would substantially increase.
According to Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen, these two community management
systems have been successful in generating and sustaining economic rents. This suc-
cess has not been uniform, however, and some communities have apparently done
much better than others. Differences in success appear to be determined by the fun-
damental potential for rent generation (biological productivity, species mix, market
access) in each TURF and the ability of local decision-making bodies to overcome
the transactions costs of collective management. How that differential success in
overcoming transactions costs relates to the characteristics of the communities, lead-
ership, group size, and other local characteristics is clearly material for further
research. It is notable that a substantial part of the added net benefits stem from out-
put and marketing improvements, not from input savings. This is in accordance with
the experience from ITQ fisheries.
Assigning Property Rights
In his paper entitled “Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool: Implications
of the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for ITQs in Fisheries,” Gary Libecap
considers the initial assignment of individual property rights to previously common
pool resources. Libecap’s approach is both analytical and empirical. More precisely,
he uses theory to derive hypotheses about actual assignments of property rights and
then compares them with empirical observations.
Libecap begins by noting that the social institution of private property rights
generally reduces the economic waste associated with the common pool/common
property arrangement. Moreover, as a rule, the higher the quality of the property
rights, the more efficient the resulting resource use. Other approaches to avoid the
common property waste, notably government regulations of various types, have gen-
erally been found to be ineffective. Thus, if economic efficiency is the aim, as social
welfare dictates, private property rights constitute the most promising way of attain-
ing it.
The introduction of private property rights into a situation of common property
logically requires the assignment of the property rights to economic agents. In gen-
eral, this assignment cannot be carried out independent of other economic and social
variables. The way in which the assignment of property rights is done may have sig-
nificant economic as well as socio-political implications. In his paper, Libecap
explores these implications.
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assignment of property rights is not a major economic issue. As long as the property
rights are freely transferable, they will end up with those that can make the greatest
use of them. In a more realistic setting, however, transactions costs of various types
are often substantial and this result does not hold. Over time, even with no transac-
tion costs, the rule for assigning property rights may have major economic
consequences. The reason is that each method of assigning property rights affects
the incentives for: (i) discovering new resources (or new uses for old ones) and (ii)
developing new property rights technologies (including technologies for the en-
forcement of property rights). Since, as demonstrated by history, both activities are
crucial for economic growth, the same applies to the incentives for undertaking
them. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the rule for assigning property rights becomes cru-
cial.
The purely technical task of selecting the most efficient rule for assigning prop-
erty rights is further confounded by the almost inevitable social struggle for who
gets these rights. As a general rule, the more potentially valuable the resource in
question and the less well socially established the assignment rule, the more inten-
sive is this fight. Social fights are costly, sometimes extremely so. This must be
taken into account in suggesting modifications to existing assignment rules.
Libecap studies three ways of assigning private property rights: (i) first posses-
sion assignment, (ii) lottery or uniform allocation, and (iii) auctions. He
convincingly argues that none of these assignment rules is uniformly most prefer-
able or “best.” The nature of the resource including its value; the presence of
existing incumbents or resource holders; and a range of transaction costs regarding
the establishment, protection, enforcement, and exchange of property rights all af-
fect the best allocation rule in any given case. Digging deeper, Libecap argues that
with a resource already under exploitation; i.e., with current incumbents, or a new
resource requiring costly search and discovery, a first possession rule would be most
efficient. For a new resource (i.e., one currently unexploited and, consequently, with
no incumbents) which is highly valuable and subject to high subsequent transfer
costs, an auction might be most efficient. Finally, for a new resource with low trans-
fer costs that is subject to strong equity sentiments, a lottery or uniform allocation
might be optimal.
On this basis—and apparently the axiom that efficient procedures tend to be
adopted by society—Libecap forwards the following empirical hypotheses concern-
ing the assignment of property rights:
(1) Resources already under exploitation: Assignment of rights to current
users.
(2) New, naturally provided resources (with strong equity sentiments) and
low transaction costs: Assignment by lottery or uniform distribution.
(3) New resources (not naturally provided and with comparatively weak
equity sentiments) with high potential rents and transaction costs:
Assignment by auction.
(4) The adoption of property rights based institutions (and assignment of
property rights) comes relatively late when the cost of open–access and/
or centralized regulation becomes too great.
(5) The most complete property rights are assigned to highly valuable, low
mobility, and easily measured resources.
Libecap goes on to compare these predictions with the experience from five em-
pirical cases in North America: (i) oil and gas reservoirs, (ii) surface water
resources; (iii) radio spectrum, (iv) air pollution permits, and (v) fisheries. He finds
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seen to what extent they are confirmed by a wider set of examples for more dispar-
aged parts of the world.
Fisheries Games
Professor Gordon Munro writes a multi-level paper entitled “Internationally Shared
Fish Stocks, the High Seas and Property Rights in Fisheries.” On one level, his pa-
per may be read as an extremely clear, illuminating account of the expansion of
national rights to marine resources in the post-World War II era. On another level,
the paper considers the games fishing nations inevitably find themselves playing as
they seek to maximize their benefits from marine resources they share with other na-
tions. The probable outcomes of these games are discussed and illustrated with
empirical examples. On the third level, Munro relates the types of games being
played and, consequently, their probable outcomes to the quality of the property
rights held by the various players. His fundamental conclusion is that the higher the
quality of national property rights, the more likely it is that the equilibrium outcome
of the game will be economically efficient.
Munro first explains how, during the post World War II period, the “Freedom of
the Seas” doctrine, as formulated, among others, by the Dutch legal and political
philosopher Hugo Grotius, was gradually eroded by the combined forces of rapidly
advancing marine exploitation technology and increased national ability to assert
sovereignty across open seas. Faced with this process, United Nations (UN) confer-
ences may be seen as attempts to adjust international law to technological and
political reality.
The first UN conference on the law of the sea, UNCLOS I, was held in Geneva
in 1956 and resulted in important international law treaties in 1958. This, however,
proved far from adequate and the second conference, UNCLOS II, was convened in
1960. This one, however, conducted at the height of the cold war, was largely unsuc-
cessful and did not conclude any treaties. The third United Nations conference on
the law of the sea, UNCLOS III, was convened in 1973 and lasted 10 years. In 1982,
it resulted in a major revision of the international law of the sea, referred to as UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. These three UN conferences on the law of the
sea did not deal exclusively or even primarily with fisheries. Nevertheless, fisheries
and national fishing rights were among the many aspects of marine resources they
were concerned with. Indeed, arguably the greatest accomplishment of UNCLOS III
was in relation to international fisheries law. Thus, as pointed out by Munro, on the
basis of UNCLOS III, and the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) became acknowledged international law. Also, and
no less importantly, Munro points out that further international agreements and trea-
ties to deal with other unresolved fisheries issues have been completed on the
foundation laid by these fundamental agreements. Among those is the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement adopted in 1995, which deals explicitly with rights to the utiliza-
tion of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
The second level of Munro’s paper explores the games that inevitably arise be-
tween nations when their property rights to fisheries are limited or insufficiently
clear. With regard to the types of games being played, Munro makes a clear distinc-
tion between transboundary fisheries resources and straddling fish stocks. The
former are shared between two or more coastal nations. The latter are at least par-
tially outside national EEZs and are thus subject to exploitation by distant water
fishing fleets. In his analysis, Munro explicitly ignores the so-called high-seas dis-
crete fish resources, which, for the most part, are fish stocks located in certain areas
on the high seas often around sea mounts.Arnason 344
The first situation, transboundary fish stocks, constitutes a relatively tractable
bargaining game situation with a fixed number of players. In this kind of a game, the
economically efficient solution is often attainable and even stable. In other words,
the core of the game is often nonempty (Shapley and Shubik 1969). However, it may
take many moves and considerable time to reach the core. Indeed, there is no guar-
antee that it will ever be reached. An important result is that if so-called side
payments are possible—total game payoff can be transferred in any proportion be-
tween the players—the core is guaranteed to be non-empty and the likelihood of
reaching it quickly is greatly increased. Munro points out that when the
transboundary stock is allocated as ITQs to individual fishers of the nations in-
volved, the playing of this kind of a game becomes much simpler and the attainment
of the core much more likely. Interestingly, it appears that an ITQ system with quo-
tas transferable between fisheries of different nationalities is theoretically equivalent
to unrestricted side payments. In transboundary fisheries games, the way the game is
played is highly dependent on the respective quality and clarity of the property
rights of the nations involved. It is precisely in this field where the various interna-
tional agreements have contributed substantially. Munro finds that the outcomes of
transboundary fisheries games where respective property rights have been well de-
fined have been mildly encouraging.
According to Munro, there is less reason for this kind of guarded optimism with
regard to straddling fish stocks. The main problem here is that of new entrants. Ac-
cording to current international law, any distant water nation can request and should
be awarded access to straddling marine resources provided it is willing to abide by
the general exploitation rules laid down by the Regional Fisheries Management Or-
ganization (RFMO). This means, as Munro carefully explains, that the regional
coastal states have a greatly reduced incentive to make the effort to agree on an effi-
cient utilization of the resource. For, were they to accomplish this, and the resource
is moderately valuable, the odds are that new entrants would appear to request their
“rightful” share in the proceeds. Thus, the benefits of cooperation are reduced, often
greatly reduced, and the likelihood of an efficient utilization correspondingly dimin-
ished.
The third level of Munro’s paper is to relate the types of international fisheries
games that are played to the property rights held by the nations involved. According
to Munro, the stronger the national property rights, the simpler the game, and the
more likely it is that an economically efficient outcome will be attained. Munro sees
the post-World War II evolution of international law of the sea as essentially an ex-
pansion in national property rights at the expense of international commons. It is
interesting that this author, probably the world’s most outstanding scholar in the
empirics and theory of international fisheries games, concludes on the basis of his
analysis and experience that “the only real solution is to finish the job” by eliminat-
ing the Freedom of the Seas by establishing de facto, if not de jure, state (or
possibly joint) property rights to the marine resources currently under the auspices
of RFMOs. By implication, the same should apply to the discrete high-seas fish re-
sources, which are otherwise not explicitly discussed in Munro’s paper.
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